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Government is today the pri-
mary regulator of the US
banking system. The Federal Re-
serve System, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and
corresponding state organizations
formulate the rules by which banks
compete for loans and funds. In the
wake of the savings and loan crisis,
many observers have begun to
question whether government can
police the system properly. In this
article we suggest an alternative
system for banking regulation: vol-
untary, cooperative arrangements
among banks for self-policing and
self-insurance.
Although it may seem odd to
imagine voluntary banking leagues
assuming a regulatory role, there
are numerous examples of volun-
tary regulatory arrangements in the
United States today. Many profes-
sional organizations in this country
accredit members. The American
Bar Association and the American
Medical Association substitute for
government agencies as regulators
of their industries. In organized
stock and futures markets, the ex-
changes themselves handle a major
portion of the regulatory work and
standard-setting.
Although self-regulation is not
currently a major part of the US
banking system, American banking
history is full of examples of volun-
tary and cooperative arrangements.
Bankers have organized themselves
into leagues or entered into agree-
ments with a view to specifying the
rules by which banking was to be
conducted. Examples of such ar-
rangements include correspondent
relationships between banks, clear-
ing houses among banks in large
cities, self-insurance schemes that
encompassed whole states—and the
8 Illinois Business Review/ Fall 1990
earliest arrangement, the so-called
Suffolk System of New England.
We will outline some of the com-
mon arguments for and against self-
regulating banking institutions. We
will consider what the nineteenth
century experience can teach us





Regulation of banking by gov-
ernment serves three distinct and
potentially separable functions:
First, government agencies serve as
insurers; second, they are policers of
bank quality and safety; and third,
they function as macroeconornic
policymakers. The first two of these
roles, insuring and policing, can
also be carried on through private
arrangements among the banks
themselves. The third role, macro-
economic policy, is properly the
province of the federal government.
Goverj^ment as Bank Insurer
Most insurance in the United
States is carried out through the
private sector. Government insur-
ance of banks is a notable exception.
The government insurance takes
two forms: the deposit insurance
schemes of the FDIC and similar
organizations, and the lender-of-
last-resort role of the Federal Re-
serve Bank.
The best justification for the gov-
ernment's insurance role actually
stems from macroeconomic consid-
erations. Widespread bank failures
in this country have been associated
with widespread economic disrup-
tion. Thus, widespread bank fail-
ures have costs well beyond the
financial system. Moreover, when
such failures are economy-wide, no
private system will have the assets
to make good on the resultant
claims. The government has the
biggest coffer of funds (and can
always print more if necessary).
Thus, it is the natural guarantor
against economy-wide banking
crises. Such guarantees build confi-
dence. Indeed, to the extent that
economy-wide crises result from
lack of confidence in the banking
system as a whole, the knowledge
that the government will step in if
necessary ensures that economy-
wide disruption will not occur.
But these macroeconomic consid-
erations do not justify the specific
forms of insurance that have actu-
ally come into place. The govern-
ment's role as a backup in the face
of cataclysmic failures does not im-
ply that government needs to be the
guarantor of individual depositors
in the face of isolated bank failures.
Government as Quality Police
The second role of government
regulation, setting and policing
standards, is also problematic.
Through various (sometimes over-
lapping) agencies, the government
formulates restrictions on the activi-
ties in which banks can engage and
the types and proportions of assets
that they may hold. Ancillary to this
function are the tasks of inspecting,
auditing, and enforcing the restric-
tions that have been devised.
In fact, the government's role as
setter of standards for banking is, in
large part, a side-effect of its role as
insurer. Federal deposit insurance
and the privileges of the discount
window are attractive subsidies
that distort the risk-taking decisions
of bankers and reduce the care with
which depositors choose their
1
banks for soundness. The structure
gives banks the incentive to engage
in excessively risky lending; the in-
surer therefore finds it necessary to
take on the role of monitor and
standard setter.
In this role the government faces
natural constraints. When a regula-
tor contemplates closing a troubled
institution, a speedy decision is
essential, because an institution's
incentive to engage in risky prac-
tices increases as its problems in-
crease. Recent experience demon-
strates that regulators are likely to
be slow in responding to crises,
showing excessive forbearance. At
the same time, government agencies
by their nature tend to be inflexible
in responding to innovation, restric-
ting new and useful forms of finan-
cial arrangements by forcing confor-
mity to the old, and possibly inap-
propriate, regulatory standards.
Private Insurance and Policing
In contrast, private organizations
have natural advantages in policing
and standard-setting. If the private
organization is acting as the insurer.
its incentives are to set standards
that are in line with the insurance it
provides. The bottom-line profita-
bility of the insurance operation
precludes excessive forbearance to
troubled institutions; competition
of other insuring groups forces
rapid adjustment to innovation in
the financial system and fosters the
provision of new forms or levels of
insurance as appropriate. Competi-
tion among insurance schemes pro-
vides an enriched menu of types of
insurance and enables the institu-
tions seeking insurance to provide
The Suffolk System: The Earliest Cooperative Arrangement
The earliest and most successful arrangement for
bank cooperation was the Suffolk System, a network
for clearing bank notes in early nineteenth century
New England. Under the Suffolk System, virtually all
New England banks maintained correspondent rela-
tionships with one or another of the Boston banks,
which agreed to redeem peripheral banks' notes on
prespecified terms. At the same time, Boston banks as
a group agreed to make markets in each other's corre-
spondent banks' notes on similar terms.
In the Suffolk System, a peripheral bank paid fees
to its correspondent in Boston, usually in the form of
zero interest on interbank balances, with extra charges
for overdrafts. Each Boston bank was charged with
regulating the circulation and monitoring the opera-
tions of its correspondents, and each Boston bank was
liable to the other Boston banks for any losses they
incurred in clearing the notes of its correspondents.
This privately organized system was the first clear
example in US financial history of an organization in
which the authority to regulate banks had been put in
alignment with the incentives for maintaining stan-
dards and policing them. Boston banks undertook the
risk of making markets in other banks' notes. To avoid
creating perverse incentives for excessive leverage and
risk-taking by correspondents, market makers kept
track of correspondent banks' activities, required
interbank deposits as collateral, and developed means
for returning excessive issues of bank notes rapidly.
The common knowledge that excessive issues were
not feasible under the discipline of the Suffolk System
made bank notes of members more readily accepted as
a medium of payment and kept exchange rates uni-
formly at par.
The system began in 1819 as the scheme of Boston's
Suffolk Bank. The bank agreed to make a market for
peripheral banks' notes in Boston. In some cases, pe-
ripheral banks were given favored treatment in return
for agreeing to deal exclusively through the Suffolk
Bank. Seeking to expand its hold on the market, in
1824 the Suffolk Bank appealed to all Boston banks to
finance a joint effort to return the currency of New
England banks that had not agreed to its terms.
Clearly, the Suffolk Bank's intentions were not al-
truistic; its initial goals were to limit competition from
peripheral banks and to profit from forced deposits. In
its 1824 appeal to other Boston banks, it argued that
Boston banks could increase their share of the loan
market by forcing the contraction of the country
banks. The 1824 redemption campaign prompted a
"bank war" in New England in which the Suffolk
Bank used the threat of random redemptions of large
amounts of notes to coerce banks to join its system. In
some cases, the Suffolk Bank clearly was selling "pro-
tection" against its own threats, and many country
banks clearly resented the monopoly power the Suf-
folk Bank enjoyed.
On the other hand, the system effectively made
New England a uniform currency area, with all bank
notes trading at par throughout New England as early
as the late 1820s. Many sanguine observers com-
mented that the discipline brought by the Suffolk
Bank increased the demand for country banks' notes,
by reducing default risk and enhancing note liquidity.
Some commentators argued that the increased de-
mand for country banks' notes more than offset their
expenses from membership in the system. Banking
commissioners in Connecticut and Maine in fact
praised the Suffolk System for its discipline and stabil-
ity during the Panic of 1837.
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an enriched menu of financial in-
struments to their depositors.
If these privately arranged insur-
ance schemes take the form of co-
insurance by banks, there are addi-
tional benefits from the relation-
ship. There is an inherent economy
in having banks monitor each other.
Banks specialize in information-
gathering: a bank's profitability
depends on the officers' ability to
make sound judgments about the
credit-worthiness of borrowers and
the riskiness of asset portfolios.
Who could be better quaUfied to
judge the solvency of a bank than
other banks? Indeed, banks are con-
stantly making such judgments in
their day-to-day dealings with other
banks. And if those banks engage in
arrangements for mutual insurance,
who has better incentive? The speed
with which coalitions of bankers
can and do act against individual
member banks contrasts with the
deliberateness typical of public
regulation in this country.
In short, if normal deposit insur-
ance is privatized, there will be a
tendency for the standard-setting
aspects of regulation to be taken on
by the insurers. And given the spe-
cialized skills of banks in monitor-
ing the soundness of portfolios of
illiquid loans, the setting of stan-
dards and their monitoring will
produce a natural advantage for
mutual insurance schemes among
banks. In such an environment, the
policing of bank adherence to stan-
dards can also become the job of
private agents: Where the govern-
ment ensures compliance with its
standards through legal sanctions, a
mutual insurance scheme can en-
sure compliance through the threat
of being dropped from the coalition.
The Remaining Role for Government
This is not to say that cooperative
arrangements among banks can be
eyUirely self-regulating. The govern-
ment, through the courts, must re-
main the ultimate enforcer of such
contracts as bank charters, or the in-
surance agreements established by
cooperatives. For example, it will
still be the government's role to
enforce the rules for bankruptcy or
for taking over a bank that is unable
to meet its depositors' demands for
liquidity. As in the case of any other
business, in banking there will still
remain a possibility of fraud, and
government must provide sanctions
against it. But in all of these situ-
ations, the government ceases to be
an active player on the day-to-day
level. Instead, the government be-
comes a force in the background,
whose very presence makes its ac-
tual intervention unnecessary.
One aspect of regulation in
which government must maintain
an active role is antitrust policy.
Under a system of cooperative
agreements among banks, govern-
ment will need to ensure the contin-
ued existence of several competing
cooperatives, in order to prevent
monopolization of the banking
sector from robbing society of the
benefits of competition.
Protecting the Public?
Pohticians often argue that the
real role of government in banking
is "protecting the public." They
make the analogy with the role of
government consumer protection
programs, which inspect products
and certify their safety and quahty.
But the importance of such a role
for government would be greatly
reduced in markets in which pri-
vate groups organize to certify
quality and set standards. CoaH-
tions of banks will have incentives
to maintain their reputation by
enforcing their own standards and
making them publicly known.
Banks would compete for custom-
ers through the quality of the insur-
ance they provide and through their
membership in the standard-setting
organization most attractive to their
depositors. Unlike the current regu-
latory situation, this would foster
greater diversity, allowing deposi-
tors with diverse needs and prefer-
ences to bank with institutions con-
forming to different standards.
The Debate about
Self-Regulating Coalitions
Given the advantage inherent in
self-regulating coalitions of banks,
we might have expected the advent
of inter-bank agreements and insti-
tutions to meet with general sup-
port. In fact, nineteenth century
observers of cooperative self-
regulatory banking arrangements
were sharply divided in their views
of the effectiveness of these rela-
tionships. Some observers took a
sanguine view, emphasizing the
stability and efficiency of these
arrangements. Others took a jaun-
diced view, arguing that they were
primarily coercive and exploitive.
According to the jaundiced view,
the profitability of banking coali-
tions derived from their ability to
limit supply and engage in monop-
oly pricing. Any gains were at the
expense of the public as a whole
and accrued in particular to the
large banks in the cooperative ar-
rangement at the expense of the
smaller banks.
The opinion of the public at large
was also divided. Many of the dra-
matic instances of regulatory
changes in nineteenth century bank-
ing were fueled by the jaundiced
view of cooperative arrangements
among banks. For many champions
of federal government intervention
into the banking system, the pri-
mary goal was the elimination of
the power of city banks through
their clearing houses, their corre-
spondent relations, and their con-
centration of reserves.
The sanguine and jaundiced
views of bank coalitions were well
represented in the qualitative evi-
dence collected by contemporary
accounts of the Suffolk System.
Observers have agreed that the
system was effective in creating an
area of uniform currency through-
out New England and in promoting
stable banking thanks to the disci-
plinary role of the Boston banks.
They have disagreed about whether
the benefits of the system went ex-
clusively to the city banks or were
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shared by country banks and the
pubhc at large.
In order to go beyond these
quaUtative assertions about the per-
formance of the Suffolk System, we
have gathered evidence comparing
the performance of the banks of the
Suffolk System with banks in
nearby states. Our evidence derives
from two sources: Congressional
documents provide information on
the balance sheets of state banks as
based on the records of state regu-
lators; and various bank note "re-
porters" are the source for discount
rates on notes.
The evidence of the note dis-
counts indicates that the Suffolk
Other Cooperative Arrangements
Clearing Houses
The New York Clearing House was founded in
1853 to facilitate check clearing among New York City
banks. It soon developed features for co-insurance,
providing for members to make markets in each
other's liabilities and to pool resources in response to
financial panics. During times of financial disturbance,
members of the clearing house continued to clear
checks, to assist each other through loans, and even to
issue joint liabilities. These forms of co-insurance were
made possible by the fact that they were aligned with
the individual banks' incentives. The procedures were
combined with substantial group authority to regulate
behavior of individual banks, including reserve re-
quirements, portfolio guidelines, and other restrictions
on banking practices. Because membership in the
coalition was valuable and because banks had an eco-
nomic interest in enforcing regulations, the threat of
expulsion for violations was a powerful and most
credible disciplinary device.
Clearing houses developed in other major northern
cities during the 1850s (Boston, Philadelphia, and Bal-
timore) and spread to cities throughout the country
after the Civil War. But these coalitions were typically
confined to banks operating in the same city. By so
limiting membership, clearing houses ensured that
their member banks maintained the incentives for effi-
cient behavior, avoiding the temptation of member
banks to "free ride" on the coalition. Monitoring could
be accomplished easily so long as banks were not too
distantly located. Furthermore, by keeping the num-
bers in a coahtion small, the coalition ensured that
member banks would continue to find it valuable to
monitor one another, since the marginal benefit of
monitoring a neighbor falls with the number of banks
in the coalition.
State Insurance Schemes
While clearing houses are the best-known examples
of coalitions of mutually regulating, co-insuring
banks, they were not the only examples. In three ante-
bellum state banking systems, Indiana, Ohio, and
Iowa, state-wide coalitions of banks were created by
statute. While these states' legislatures created the in-
surance systems, they did not run them. The law re-
quired members of the coalition to participate in the
setting and enforcing of regulatory guidelines. More
important, it created an incentive for banks to do so
by making them mutually liable for any loss to
banks' liability holders. The self-regulatory authority
was granted the powers to set reserve guidelines and
standards for banking practices. It also had the
power to close offending banks. The number of
banks was also limited in each of these states, so that
the incentives to monitor were maintained.
These three midwestern co-insurance systems
were extraordinarily successful. They suffered virtu-
ally no bank failures or fraud. Banking problems
were detected early and corrected by the group lead-
ership. During regional or national panics, in which
suspension of convertibility was widespread, these
banks typically maintained it. The performance of
these three state systems is in sharp contrast to the
uniform failure of government-run state bank liabil-
ity insurance systems of the nineteenth century.
Informal Coordination
Finally, some banking coordination occurred in
more informal ways, through ad hoc arrangements
during crises. The antebellum South, with its small
number of large branching banks, is the quintessen-
tial example. During the Panic of 1837, representa-
tives of banks from all over the South met in Char-
leston, S.C, to agree on a plan for maintaining inter-
bank convertibility in the face of general suspension
of convertibility. Rules limiting banks' growth and
activities in the interim accompanied agreements to
make markets in each other's notes and deposits.
Similarly, during the Panic of 1857, southern banks
seem to have cooperated more effectively to pool
reserves, support one another, and limit the disrup-
tions due to suspension of convertibility.
The relative success of the South seems attribut-
able, in part, to the greater ease of communication
and monitoring in a system dominated by a rela-
tively small number of geographically overlapping,
branching banks. Unlike the many scattered unit
banks of the North, southern branching banks could
pool resources, monitor behavior, and reduce the
transaction and information costs inherent in form-
ing coalitions, without having to set up formal struc-
tures to do so.
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System improved the acceptability
of notes oi all New England banks.
The evidence from the banks' bal-
ance sheets also tends to confirm the
view that the gains in efficiency
from the Suffolk System were
widely shared.
We find that the banks of New
England were able to provide notes
backed by lower levels of specie, but
that the public regarded these notes
as perfectly safe. Evidently public
confidence in the New England
banking arrangements enabled the
banks to economize on holding of
expensive reserves.
At the same time, the banking
system had a higher penetration
into the economies of the New Eng-
land states than into the economies
of the rest of the northeast. Appar-
ently banks were better able to pro-
vide services for the population in
the Suffolk System states; the natu-
ral conclusion is that the increased
efficiency allowed the public at large
to benefit from the advantages in-
herent in the system.
The results are not entirely rosy:
There is evidence of greater dispar-
ity in the degree of banking services
available in the areas of New Eng-
land than in the Middle Atlantic
states. Nonetheless, in absolute
terms, even the least developed por-
tions of New England were, for the
most part, as well served as those in
the Middle Atlantic area. In short,
the preponderance of evidence sup-
ports the sanguine view of banking
coalitions as beneficial to the econ-
omy as a whole.
Lessons for Current
Regulatory Reform
The Problem ami a Solution
In the wake of the difficulties of
the savings and loan institutions, re-
cent studies of deposit insurance
funds have focused on the perverse
incentives created by mispricing of
deposit insurance. Insurance en-
courages excess risk-taking by exist-
ing banks, particularly if prior losses
leave them with little capital to lose.
Thus, insurance provides a potential
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for unscrupulous, or merely inexpe-
rienced, entrepreneurs to enter
banking as a means to finance their
risky enterprises. Insurance tends to
remove the discipline of the market,
which normally would prevent
such entrepreneurs from having
access to funds: Depositors of in-
sured institutions have little incen-
tive to discriminate between re-
sponsible and irresponsible man-
agement when deciding where to
place their funds.
Nonetheless, the insurance of
bank liabilities exerts a desirable
stabilizing influence. Banks, more
than other institutions, are vulner-
able to panics induced by deposi-
tors' uncertainty. How then can we
provide credible protection of the
banking and payments system
without creating costs associated
with the incentives for excessive
risk-taking? It is here that the his-
torical success of self-regulating, co-
insuring systems of banks provides
a possible solution.
The critical distinction between
self-regulating agreements and
government-run schemes is this:
Only in the self-regulating agree-
ments were the regulations aligned
with incentives for the banks to
maintain and police standards. By
making banks as a group bear the
costs for insuring depositors—and
the savings from handling insur-
ance more effectively—we can
achieve more effective regulation.
Pitfalls along the Way
There are at least three chal-
lenges to a successful application of
the lessons of self-regulating bank
coordination to current banking
reform: First, how can we ensure
that banking coalitions will not
degenerate into monopolistic car-
tels, using their powers of coordina-
tion to reduce the competitiveness
of the banking industry? Second,
given preexisting regulatory ar-
rangements and vested interests in
their maintenance, is it realistic to
imagine politicians dissolving cur-
rent agencies and relinquishing
authority to the banks? Third, are
today's banks prepared for the
responsibility—that is, do they have
the resources to make co-insurance
credible? Each of these concerns is
legitimate; together they dictate
important limitations on any at-
tempt to incorporate self-regulatory
features into the current system of
federal deposit insurance. We will
examine them in order:
• First, the problem of limited
competitiveness. The record of the
Suffolk System makes it clear that,
while the potential for monopoliza-
tion need not be an overwhelming
concern, it is a legitimate one. In
any new regulatory regime, the
government must maintain an anti-
trust role, ensuring freedom of en-
try for new banks and competition
among co-insurance arrangements.
Ideally, there would arise a handful
of parallel groups, each with several
nationwide branching banks. So
long as no group has a geographic
monopoly, no alarm need be raised;
but this dictates that special atten-
tion be paid to the problems of local
market monopolization should the
co-insurance arrangements be
leagues of unit-banks.
• Second, the issue of political
feasibility. It is fanciful to expect
Congress all at once to scrap the ex-
isting system and replace it with na-
tionwide, privately managed, bank
groupings. Nonetheless, there are
practicable steps in that direction
that would reduce the costs of gov-
ernment deposit insurance by en-
listing the assistance of banks in
supervision. For example, banks
could be allowed to form groups for
mutual monitoring. These groups
could be granted rewards in the
form of reduced insurance premi-
ums for agreeing to engage in
monitoring and assessed penalties
in the form of higher premiums for
any failure to detect or report viola-
tions or insolvencies of banks in
their group. At the very least this
would provide a strong counterbal-
ance to political encouragement of
excessive forbearance by creating
I
Why Didn't Cooperation Extend Nationally?
If cooperative arrangements are good, it would
seem that widespread cooperative arrangements
would be even better. A nationwide group of branch-
ing banks would have been able to achieve substantial
advantages, since the ease of coordination and greater
diversification would have reduced banking fragility
and financial panics. The failure to develop nation-
wide banking coalitions seems attributable to restric-
tions on branching.
Cooperative arrangements benefitted from and
required mutual monitoring. There is, thus, a natural
limit to the size of a cooperative arrangement.
The benefits of cooperative arrangements could not be
achieved in a system composed of several thousand
geographically separate unit banks. While inter-
regional correspondent relations continued to play an
important role in the national payments system, and
correspondents often borrowed and lent to each other,
such bilateral activity was not part of any co-insurance
relation. The unique vulnerability of the US financial
system and the unusual frequency and severity of
banking crises in the United States testifies to the
weakness of nationwide unit banking in that era as a
structure for preserving system-wide stability.
an interest group whose incentive is
to monitor banks and blow the
whistle early on insolvent institu-
tions. As the advantages of the sys-
tem become more apparent, more
substantive reforms in the direction
of self-regulation might become
more feasible.
Finally, the question of banks'
capacity for co-insurance. Historical
studies of losses to banks during
financial crises emphasize that,
apart from losses attributable to
mismanagement of insurance
schemes, bank capital has always
been large relative to aggregate
bank losses. Thus, the capacity is
available. Even the Great Depres-
sion may be only an apparent, not a
real, exception: Large bank losses
during the Great Depression may
be primarily a testimony to the
government's ability to destroy an
economy through deflationary pol-
icy, not a measure of the inherent
vulnerability of the banking system.
Suppose, however, that we con-
ceded that in some extreme circum-
stances the government must stand
ready to support the financial sys-
tem. We would still argue that the
government's proper role is as a
back-up to private schemes, through
a system of shared responsibility.
Lesser shocks should be the respon-
sibility of private, self-regulating
groups, with the government
providing stop-gap protection
against systemic collapse.
How might this be arranged?
The government's back-up plan
could provide that co-insurance
among banks would be relied upon
entirely to reimburse depositors in
cases in which fewer than a speci-
fied number of banks fail, but the
government would share increas-
ingly in subsequent losses. By re-
stricting the government's role to
"catastrophe coverage," adequate
incentives are retained for interbank
discipline of banking coalitions
without risking widespread failure.
Such an explicit division of re-
sponsibility has additional advan-
tages. Since it is likely that the
government will intervene in severe
crises even in the absence of an ex-
plicit commitment to do so, it will
be desirable to have the commit-
ment spelled out. This offers the
best chances for limiting congres-
sional temptations to intervene in
the pursuit of an individual
banker's interest but against the
interest of the public at large.
Summary
Cooperative arrangements
among banks are an alternative to
current regulation of the banking
system. Theoretically, cooperative
arrangements are better able to
align the incentives of the banks in
the system with the regulations
adopted for maintaining standards
of quality. This theoretically pre-
dicted match-up was, in fact, a char-
acteristic of nineteenth century co-
operative arrangements. In particu-
lar, the Suffolk System of New Eng-
land was a significantly more effi-
cient banking arrangement than
those found in neighboring states,
and the benefits of the system were
enjoyed by the public at large, not
just by the large banks of Boston.
The lessons of the nineteenth
century experience are relevant for
the late twentieth century. Coopera-
tive arrangements can and should
play a role in current reforms of the
institutions for deposit insurance.
Encouragement of the growth of
cooperative arrangements for self-
regulation is both economically
desirable and politically feasible.
Perhaps the regulation of banking
by banks is an idea whose time has
come again.
Illinois Business Review/ Fall 1990 13
